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We summarize a new realist, unextravagant interpretation of quantum theory that builds on the
existing physical structure of the theory and allows experiments to have definite outcomes but leaves
the theory’s basic dynamical content essentially intact. Much as classical systems have specific states
that evolve along definite trajectories through configuration spaces, the traditional formulation of
quantum theory permits assuming that closed quantum systems have specific states that evolve
unitarily along definite trajectories through Hilbert spaces, and our interpretation extends this
intuitive picture of states and Hilbert-space trajectories to the more realistic case of open quantum
systems despite the generic development of entanglement. Our interpretation—which we claim is
ultimately compatible with Lorentz invariance—reformulates wave-function collapse in terms of an
underlying interpolating dynamics, makes it possible to derive the Born rule from deeper principles,
and resolves several open questions regarding ontological stability and dynamics.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this letter and in a more comprehensive companion
paper [1], we present a realist interpretation of quantum
theory that hews closely to the basic structure of the the-
ory in its widely accepted current form. Our primary goal
is to move beyond instrumentalism and describe an ac-
tual reality that lies behind the mathematical formalism
of quantum theory. We also intend to provide new hope
to those who find themselves disappointed with the pace
of progress on making sense of the theory’s foundations
[2, 3].
A. Why Do We Need a New Interpretation?
Despite the absence of a clear consensus on all the
Copenhagen interpretation’s precise metaphysical com-
mitments, it is still, at least according to some surveys
[4, 5], the most popular interpretation of quantum theory
today, but it also suffers from a number of serious draw-
backs. Most significantly, the definition of a measure-
ment according to the Copenhagen interpretation relies
on a physically questionable demarcation, known as the
Heisenberg cut (Heisenbergscher Schnitt) [6, 7], between
the large classical systems that carry out measurements
and the small quantum systems that they measure. (See
Figure 1.) This ill-defined Heisenberg cut has never been
identified in any experiment to date and must be put into
the interpretation by hand. An associated issue is the in-
terpretation’s assumption of wave-function collapse, by
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which we refer to the supposedly instantaneous, discon-
tinuous change in a quantum system immediately follow-
ing a measurement by a classical system, in stark contrast
to the smooth time evolution that governs dynamically
closed systems.
The Copenhagen interpretation is also unclear as to the
ultimate meaning of the state vector of a system: Does a
system’s state vector merely represent the experimenter’s
knowledge, is it some sort of objective probability distri-
bution,1 or is it an irreducible ingredient of reality like
the state of a classical system [11]? For that matter,
what constitutes an observer, and can we meaningfully
talk about the state of an observer within the formalism
of quantum theory? Given that no realistic system is
ever perfectly free of quantum entanglement with other
systems, and thus no realistic system can ever truly be
assigned a specific state vector in the first place, what
becomes of the popular depiction of quantum theory in
which every particle is purportedly described by a specific
wave function propagating in three-dimensional space?
The Copenhagen interpretation leads to additional trou-
ble when trying to make sense of thought experiments
like Schro¨dinger’s cat, Wigner’s friend, and the quantum
Zeno paradox.2
A more satisfactory interpretation would eliminate the
need for an ad hoc Heisenberg cut, thereby demoting
measurements to an ordinary kind of interaction and
allowing quantum theory to be a complete theory that
seamlessly encompasses all systems in Nature, includ-
ing observers as physical systems with quantum states
of their own. Moreover, an acceptable interpretation
1 Recent work [8–10] casts considerable doubt on assertions that
state vectors are nothing more than probability distributions over
more fundamental ingredients of reality.
2 We discuss all these thought experiments in our companion paper
[1].
2Heisenberg Cut
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Ψ
Ψ
Ψ
Figure 1. The Heisenberg cut.
should fundamentally (even if not always superficially)
be consistent with all experimental data and other reli-
ably known features of Nature, including relativity, and
should be general enough to accommodate the large va-
riety of both presently known and hypothetical physi-
cal systems. Such an interpretation should also address
the key no-go theorems developed over the years by re-
searchers working on the foundations of quantum theory;
should not depend on concepts or quantities whose defi-
nitions require a physically unrealistic measure-zero level
of sharpness; and should be insensitive to potentially un-
knowable features of reality, such as whether we can sen-
sibly define “the universe as a whole” as being a closed
or open system.
B. Motivation from Classical Physics
Our interpretation is fully quantum in nature. How-
ever, for purposes of motivation, consider the basic the-
oretical structure of classical physics: A classical system
has a specific state—which we call its “ontic state”—that
evolves in time through the system’s configuration space
according to some dynamical rule that may or may not be
stochastic, and this dynamical rule exists whether or not
the system’s state lies beneath a nontrivial evolving prob-
ability distribution—called an “epistemic state”—on the
system’s configuration space; moreover, the dynamical
rule for the system’s underlying ontic state is consistent
with the overall evolution of the system’s epistemic state,
in the sense that if we consider a probabilistic ensemble
over the system’s initial ontic state and apply the dy-
namical rule to each ontic state in the ensemble, then
we correctly obtain the overall evolution of the system’s
epistemic state as a whole.
In particular, note the insufficiency of specifying a
dynamical rule solely for the evolution of the system’s
overall probability distribution—that is, for its epistemic
state alone—but not for the system’s underlying ontic
state itself, because then the system’s underlying ontic
state would be free to fluctuate wildly and discontin-
uously between macroscopically distinct configurations.
For example, even in the simple case in which a classical
system’s epistemic state describes constant probabilities
p1 and p2 for the system to be in respective macroscopi-
cally distinct ontic states q1 or q2, there would be nothing
preventing the system’s ontic state from hopping discon-
tinuously between q1 and q2 with respective frequency
ratios p1 and p2 over arbitrarily short time intervals. Es-
sentially, by imposing a dynamical rule on the system’s
underlying ontic state, we can provide a “smoothness
condition” for the system’s hidden physical configuration
over time and thus eliminate these kinds of instabilities.
(“Hidden variables need hidden dynamics.”)
In quantum theory, a system that is exactly closed and
that is exactly in a pure state (both conditions that are
unphysical idealizations) evolves along a well-defined tra-
jectory through the system’s Hilbert space according to
a well-known dynamical rule, namely, the Schro¨dinger
equation. However, in traditional formulations of quan-
tum theory, an open quantum system that must be de-
scribed by a density matrix due to entanglement with
other systems—that is, a system in a so-called improper
mixture—does not have a specific underlying ontic state
vector, let alone a Hilbert-space trajectory or a dynam-
ical rule governing the time evolution of such an under-
lying ontic state vector and consistent with the overall
evolution of the system’s density matrix.
It is a chief goal of our interpretation of quantum the-
ory to provide these missing ingredients—in large part by
assigning an explicit meaning to improper mixtures. In
a sense that we will make much more precise, our inter-
pretation of quantum theory asserts that systems have
actual states that evolve along kinematical trajectories
through their state spaces, and that those trajectories are
governed by specific (if approximate) dynamical rules.
II. THE MINIMAL MODAL INTERPRETATION
A. Conceptual Summary
In short, rather than invoking the Born rule together
with a collapse postulate that converts improper mix-
tures into proper mixtures—that is, into classical proba-
bility distributions over sets of definite outcomes—we in-
stead attach an interpretation directly to improper mix-
tures: For a quantum system in a fully improper mixture,
our new interpretation identifies the eigenstates of the
system’s density matrix with the possible states of the
system in reality and identifies the eigenvalues of that
density matrix with the probabilities that one of those
possible states is actually occupied. Our interpretation
introduces just enough minimal structure beyond that
simple picture to provide a dynamical rule for underlying
3state vectors as they evolve along Hilbert-space trajecto-
ries and to evade criticisms made in the past regarding
similar interpretations. This minimal additional struc-
ture consists of a new class of conditional probabilities
amounting essentially to a series of smoothness condi-
tions that kinematically relate the states of parent sys-
tems to the states of their subsystems, as well as dynam-
ically relate the states of a single system to each other
over time.
B. Technical Summary
Our new interpretation, which we call the minimal
modal interpretation of quantum theory and which we
motivate and detail more extensively in our companion
paper [1], consists of several parsimonious ingredients:
1. Ontic States: We define quantum ontic states
Ψi—meaning the states of a given system as it
could actually exist in reality—in terms of arbi-
trary (unit-norm) state vectors |Ψi〉 in the system’s
Hilbert space H:
Ψi ↔ |Ψi〉 ∈ H (up to overall phase) . (1)
This definition is the quantum counterpart to the
classical notion of ontic states as elements in a con-
figuration space.
2. Epistemic States: We define quantum epistemic
states {(pi,Ψi)}i as probability distributions over
sets of possible quantum ontic states,
{(pi,Ψi)}i , pi ∈ [0, 1] ,
where, again, this definition parallels the corre-
sponding notion from classical physics. We trans-
late logical mutual exclusivity of ontic states Ψi
as mutual orthogonality of state vectors |Ψi〉, and
we make a distinction between subjective epistemic
states (proper mixtures) and objective epistemic
states (improper mixtures): The former arise from
merely classical ignorance and are uncontroversial,
whereas the latter arise from quantum entangle-
ment with other systems and do not have a widely
accepted a priori meaning outside of our interpre-
tation of quantum theory. Indeed, the problem
of interpreting objective epistemic states may well
be unavoidable: All realistic systems are entangled
with other systems to a nonzero degree and thus
cannot be described exactly by pure states or by
purely subjective epistemic states.3 As part of our
3 As we explain in Section II E, there are reasons to be skeptical of
the common assumption that one can always assign an exactly
pure state or purely subjective epistemic state to “the universe
as a whole.”
introduction of epistemic states into quantum the-
ory, we posit a correspondence between objective
epistemic states {(pi,Ψi)}i and density matrices ρˆ:
{(pi,Ψi)}i ↔ ρˆ =
∑
i
pi |Ψi〉 〈Ψi| . (2)
(See Figure 2.) The relationship between subjec-
tive epistemic states and density matrices is not as
strict, as we explain in our companion paper [1].
3. Partial Traces: We invoke the partial-trace oper-
ation ρˆQ ≡ TrE [ρˆQ+E ], motivated and defined in
our companion paper [1] without appeals to the
Born rule or Born-rule-based averages, to relate
the density matrix (and thus the epistemic state)
of any subsystem Q to that of any parent system
W = Q+ E.
4. Quantum Conditional Probabilities: We in-
troduce a general class of quantum conditional
probabilities,
pQ1,...,Qn|W (i1, . . . , in; t
′|w; t)
≡ TrW
[(
PˆQ1 (i1; t
′)⊗ · · · ⊗ PˆQn (in; t′)
)
Et′←tW [PˆW (w; t)]
]
∼ Tr[Pˆi1 (t′) · · · Pˆin (t′) E [Pˆw (t)]],
(3)
relating the possible ontic states of any parti-
tioning collection of mutually disjoint subsystems
Q1, . . . , Qn to the possible ontic states of a cor-
responding parent system W = Q1 + · · · + Qn
whose own dynamics is governed approximately
by a linear completely-positive-trace-preserving
(“CPTP”) dynamical mapping Et′←tW over the
given time interval t′ − t. Here the operator
PˆW (w; t) denotes the eigenprojector onto the
eigenstate |ΨW (w; t)〉 of the density matrix ρˆW (t)
of the parent system W at the initial time t, and,
similarly, for α = 1, . . . , n, the operator PˆQα (i; t
′)
denotes the eigenprojector onto the eigenstate
|ΨQα (i; t′)〉 of the density matrix ρˆQα (t′) of the
subsystem Qα at the final time t
′. In a rough
sense, the dynamical mapping Et′←tW acts as a
parallel-transport superoperator that moves the
parent-system eigenprojector PˆW (w; t) from t
to t′ before we compare it with the subsystem
eigenprojectors PˆQα (i; t
′).
In generalizing unitary dynamics to linear
CPTP dynamics in this manner, as is necessary in
order to account for the crucial and non-reductive
quantum relationships between parent systems and
their subsystems, note that we are not proposing
any fundamental modifications to the dynamics of
quantum theory nor any new sources of violations
of time-reversal symmetry, such as occur in GRW-
type spontaneous-localization models [12], but
4are simply accommodating the fact that generic
mesoscopic and macroscopic quantum systems
are typically open to their environments to some
nonzero degree. Indeed, linear CPTP dynamical
mappings are widely used in quantum chemistry
as well as in quantum information science, in
which they are known as quantum operations;
when specifically regarded as carriers of quantum
information, they are usually called quantum
channels.4 A well-known, concrete example is the
Lindblad equation [21].
As one special case, our quantum conditional
probabilities provide a kinematical smoothing
relationship
pQ1,...,Qn|W (i1, . . . , in|w)
≡ TrW
[(
PˆQ1 (i1)⊗ · · · ⊗ PˆQn (in)
)
PˆW (w)
]
= 〈ΨW,w| (|ΨQ1,i1〉 〈ΨQ1,i1 | ⊗ · · ·
⊗ |ΨQn,in〉 〈ΨQn,in |) |ΨW,w〉
(4)
between the possible ontic states of any parti-
tioning collection of mutually disjoint subsystems
Q1, . . . , Qn and the possible ontic states of the cor-
responding parent system W = Q1 + · · · + Qn at
any single moment in time. As another special
case, if we take Q ≡ Q1 = W , then our quantum
conditional probabilities also provide a dynamical
smoothing relationship
pQ (i
′; t′|i; t) ≡ TrQ[PˆQ (i′; t′) Et′←tQ [PˆQ (i; t)]]
∼ Tr[Pˆi′ (t′) E [Pˆi (t)]]
(5)
between the possible ontic states of the system Q
over time and also between the objective epistemic
states of the system Q over time.
Essentially, 1 establishes a linkage between ontic states
and elements of Hilbert spaces, 2 establishes a linkage
between (objective) epistemic states and density matri-
ces, 3 establishes a linkage between parent-system density
matrices and subsystem density matrices, and 4 estab-
lishes a linkage between parent-system ontic states and
subsystem ontic states as well as between parent-system
4 See [13–15] for early work in this direction, and see [16] for a mod-
ern pedagogical review. Starting from a simple measure of dis-
tinguishability between density matrices that is non-increasing
under linear CPTP dynamics [17], one can argue [18, 19] that lin-
ear CPTP dynamics implies the absence of any backward flow of
information into the system from its environment. [20] strength-
ens this reasoning by proving that exact linear CPTP dynamics
exists for a given quantum system if and only if the system’s
initial correlations with its environment satisfy a quantum data-
processing inequality that prevents backward information flow.
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Figure 2. A schematic depiction of our postulated relationship
between a system’s density matrix ρˆ and its associated epis-
temic state {(p1,Ψ1) , (p2,Ψ2) , (p3,Ψ3) , . . . }. The latter con-
sists of epistemic probabilities p1, p2, p3, . . . (the eigenvalues
of the density matrix) and possible ontic states Ψ1,Ψ2,Ψ3, . . .
(represented by the eigenstates of the density matrix), where
one of those possible ontic states (in this example, Ψ2) is the
system’s actual ontic state.
epistemic states and subsystem epistemic states, either
at the same time or at different times.
After verifying in our companion paper [1] that our
quantum conditional probabilities satisfy a number of
consistency requirements, we show that they allow us to
avoid ontological instabilities that have presented prob-
lems for other modal interpretations, analyze the mea-
surement process, study various familiar “paradoxes” and
thought experiments, and examine the status of Lorentz
invariance and locality in our interpretation of quantum
theory. In particular, our interpretation accommodates
the nonlocality implied by the EPR-Bohm and GHZ-
Mermin thought experiments without leading to superlu-
minal signaling, and evades claims by Myrvold [22] pur-
porting to show that interpretations like our own lead
to unacceptable ontological contradictions with Lorentz
invariance. As a consequence of its compatibility with
Lorentz invariance, we claim that our interpretation is
capable of encompassing all the familiar quantum mod-
els of physical systems in widespread use today, from
nonrelativistic point particles to quantum field theories
and even string theory.
C. Modal Interpretations
Our use of the modifiers “possible and “actual,” to-
gether known formally as modalities, identifies our inter-
pretation of quantum theory as belonging to the general
class of modal interpretations originally introduced by
Krips in 1969 [23–25] and then independently developed
by van Fraassen (whose early formulations involved the
fusion of modal logic with quantum logic), Dieks, Ver-
maas, and others [26–30].
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compass a very large set of interpretations of quantum
theory, including most interpretations that fall between
the “many worlds” of the Everett-DeWitt approach and
the “no worlds” of the instrumentalist approaches. Gen-
erally speaking, in a modal interpretation, one singles
out some preferred basis for each system’s Hilbert space
and then regards the elements of that basis as being the
system’s possible ontic states—one of which is the sys-
tem’s actual ontic state—much in keeping with how we
think conceptually about classical probability distribu-
tions. For example, as emphasized in [30], the traditional
de Broglie-Bohm pilot-wave interpretation [31–33] can be
regarded as being a special kind of modal interpretation
in which the preferred basis is permanently fixed for all
systems at a universal choice. Other modal interpreta-
tions, such as our own, instead allow the preferred basis
for a given system to change—in our case by choosing the
preferred basis to be the evolving eigenbasis of that sys-
tem’s density matrix. However, we claim that no existing
modal interpretation captures the one that we summarize
in this letter and describe more fully in our companion
paper [1].
D. Hidden Variables and the Irreducibility of
Ontic States
To the extent that our interpretation of quantum the-
ory involves hidden variables, the actual ontic states un-
derlying the epistemic states of systems play that role.
However, one could also argue that calling them hidden
variables is just a matter of semantics because they are
on the same metaphysical footing as both the traditional
notion of quantum states as well as the actual ontic states
of classical systems.
In any event, it is important to note that our inter-
pretation includes no other hidden variables: Just as in
the classical case, we regard ontic states as being irre-
ducible objects, and, in keeping with this interpretation,
we do not regard a system’s ontic state itself as being
an epistemic probability distribution—much less a “pi-
lot wave”—over a set of more basic hidden variables. In
a rough sense, our interpretation unifies the de Broglie-
Bohm interpretation’s pilot wave and hidden variables
into a single ontological entity that we call an ontic state.
In particular, we do not attach an epistemic probability
interpretation to the components of a vector represent-
ing a system’s ontic state, nor do we assume a priori the
Born rule, which we ultimately derive in our compan-
ion paper [1] as a means of computing empirical outcome
probabilities. Otherwise, we would need to introduce an
unnecessary additional level of probabilities into our in-
terpretation and thereby reduce its axiomatic parsimony
and explanatory power.
Via the phenomenon of environmental decoherence,
our interpretation ensures that the evolving ontic state
of a sufficiently macroscopic system—with significant en-
ergy and in contact with a larger environment—is highly
likely to be represented by a temporal sequence of state
vectors whose labels evolve in time according to recogniz-
able semiclassical equations of motion. For microscopic,
isolated systems, by contrast, we simply accept that the
ontic state vector may not usually have an intuitively
familiar classical description.
E. Comparison with Other Interpretations of
Quantum Theory
Our interpretation, which builds on the work of many
others, is general, model-independent, and encompasses
relativistic systems, but is also conservative and unex-
travagant: It includes only metaphysical objects that are
either already a standard part of quantum theory or that
have counterparts in classical physics. We do not posit
the existence of exotic “many worlds” [34–37], physical
“pilot waves” [31–33], or any fundamental GRW-type
dynamical-collapse or spontaneous-localization modifica-
tions to quantum theory [12, 38–40]. Indeed, our inter-
pretation leaves the widely accepted mathematical struc-
ture of quantum theory essentially intact.5 At the same
time, we argue in our companion paper [1] that our in-
terpretation is ultimately compatible with Lorentz invari-
ance and is nonlocal only in the mild sense familiar from
the framework of classical gauge theories.
Furthermore, we make no assumptions about as-yet-
unknown aspects of reality, such as the fundamental dis-
creteness or continuity of time or the dimensionality of
the ultimate Hilbert space of Nature. Nor does our in-
terpretation rely in any crucial way upon the existence of
a well-defined maximal parent system that encompasses
all other systems and is dynamically closed in the sense
of having a so-called cosmic pure state or universal wave
function that precisely obeys the Schro¨dinger equation;
by contrast, this sort of unsubstantiated cosmic assump-
tion is a necessarily exact ingredient in the traditional
5 Moreover, our interpretation does not introduce any new viola-
tions of time-reversal symmetry and gives no fundamental role
to relative states [34]; a cosmic multiverse or self-locating uncer-
tainty [41]; coarse-grained histories or decoherence functionals
[42, 43]; decision theory [44, 45]; Dutch-book coherence, SIC-
POVMs, or urgleichungs [46]; circular frequentist arguments in-
volving unphysical “limits” of infinitely many copies of measure-
ment devices [41, 47, 48]; infinite imaginary ensembles [49]; quan-
tum reference systems or perspectivalism [50, 51]; relational or
non-global quantum states [52–55]; many-minds states [56]; mir-
ror states [54, 55]; faux-Boolean algebras [30, 57]; “atomic” sub-
systems [58]; algebraic quantum field theory [59]; secret classical
superdeterminism or fundamental information loss [60]; cellular
automata [61]; classical matrix degrees of freedom or trace dy-
namics [62]; or discrete Hilbert spaces or appeals to unknown
Planck-scale physics [48].
6formulations of the de Broglie-Bohm pilot-wave interpre-
tation and the Everett-DeWitt many-worlds interpreta-
tion.
Indeed, by considering merely the possibility that our
observable universe is but a small region of an eter-
nally inflating cosmos of indeterminate spatial size and
age [63–65], it becomes clear that the idea of a biggest
closed system containing all other systems (“the universe
as a whole”) may not generally be a sensible or empiri-
cally verifiable concept to begin with, let alone an axiom
on which a robust interpretation of quantum theory can
safely rely. Our interpretation certainly allows for the ex-
istence of a biggest closed system in an objectively pure
state, but is also fully able to accommodate the alter-
native circumstance that if we were to imagine gradu-
ally enlarging our scope to parent systems of increasing
physical size, then we might well find that the hierarchi-
cal sequence never terminates at any maximal, dynami-
cally closed system, but may instead lead to an unending
“Russian-doll” succession of ever-more-open parent sys-
tems in objectively mixed states representing improper
mixtures.6
III. MEASUREMENTS AND LORENTZ
INVARIANCE
A. Von Neumann Measurements and the Born
Rule
For the purposes of establishing how our minimal
modal interpretation makes sense of measurements,
how decoherence turns the environment into a “many-
dimensional chisel” that rapidly sculpts the ontic states
of systems into their precise shapes,7 and how the Born
rule naturally emerges to an excellent approximation, we
consider in our companion paper [1] the idealized exam-
ple of a so-called Von Neumann measurement. Along the
6 To avoid this problem, one might try to argue that one can always
formally define a closed maximal parent system—presumably in
an objectively pure state—just to be “the system containing all
systems.” Whatever logicians might say about such a construc-
tion, we run into the more prosaic issue that if we cannot con-
struct this closed maximal parent system via a well-defined suc-
cession of parent systems of incrementally increasing size, then
it becomes unclear mathematically how we can generally define
any human-scale system as a subsystem of the maximal parent
system and thereby define the partial-trace operation. Further-
more, if our observable cosmic region is indeed an open system,
then its own time evolution may not be exactly linear—an impor-
tant feature of generic open systems that is rarely acknowledged
in the literature—in which case it is far from obvious that we
can safely and rigorously embed that open-system time evolu-
tion into the hypothetical unitary dynamics of any conceivable
closed parent system.
7 The way that decoherence sculpts ontic states into shape is rem-
iniscent of the way that the external pressure of air molecules
above a basin of water maintains the water in its liquid phase.
way, we also address the status of both the measurement
problem generally and the notion of wave-function col-
lapse specifically in the context of our interpretation of
quantum theory. Ultimately, we find that our interpre-
tation solves the measurement problem by replacing in-
stantaneous axiomatic wave-function collapse with an in-
terpolating ontic-level dynamics, and thereby eliminates
the need for an ad hoc Heisenberg cut.
B. The Myrvold No-Go Theorem
Building on a paper by Dickson and Clifton [66] and
employing arguments similar to Hardy [67], Myrvold [22]
argued that modal interpretations are fundamentally in-
consistent with Lorentz invariance at a deeper level than
mere unobservable nonlocality, leading to much addi-
tional work [53, 59, 68] in subsequent years to deter-
mine the implications of his result. Specifically, Myrvold
argued that assuming the existence of ontic states un-
derlying density matrices could lead to paradoxes aris-
ing from Lorentz transformations. Seemingly the only
way to avoid this conclusion would then be to break
Lorentz symmetry in a fundamentally ontological way
by asserting the existence of a universal “preferred” ref-
erence frame in which all ontic-state assignments must
be made.
Myrvold’s claims, and those of Dickson and Clifton as
well as Hardy, rest on assumptions that do not hold in our
interpretation of quantum theory. In particular, Dickson
and Clifton [66] assume that hidden ontic states admit
certain joint epistemic probabilities that are conditioned
on multiple disjoint systems at an initial time, and such
probabilities are not a part of our interpretation, as we
explain in our companion paper [1].8 Similarly, all of
Myrvold’s arguments hinge on the assumed existence of
joint epistemic probabilities for two disjoint systems at
two or more separate times—some of which are, more-
over, Lorentz-transformed times—and again such prob-
abilities are not present in our interpretation. As Dick-
son and Clifton point out in Appendix B of their paper,
Hardy’s argument also depends on several inadmissible
assumptions about ontic property assignments in modal
interpretations.
C. Quantum Theory and Classical Gauge Theories
Suppose that we were to imagine reifying all the pos-
sible ontic states defined by every system’s density ma-
trix as simultaneous actual ontic states in the sense of
8 The same implicit assumption occurs in Section 9.2 of [30].
7the many-worlds interpretation.9 Then because every
density matrix as a whole evolves locally and there is
no single actual ontic state that jumps between different
possible ontic states, no nonlocal dynamics between the
actual ontic states is necessary and our interpretation of
quantum theory becomes manifestly dynamically local:
For example, each spin detector in the EPR-Bohm or
GHZ-Mermin thought experiments possesses all its pos-
sible results in actuality, and the larger measurement that
later compares the results of the spin detectors apparatus
locally “splits” into all the various possibilities when it
visits each spin detector and looks at the detector’s final
reading.
In our companion paper [1], we argue that we can make
sense of this step of adding unphysical actual ontic states
into our interpretation of quantum theory by appealing to
an analogy with classical gauge theories, and specifically
the example of the Maxwell theory of electromagnetism.
Just as different choices of gauge for a given classical
gauge theory make different calculations or properties of
the theory more or less manifest—that is, each choice of
gauge inevitably involves trade-offs—we see that switch-
ing from the “unitary gauge” corresponding to the orig-
inal version of our interpretation of quantum theory to
the “Lorenz gauge” in which it looks more like a density-
matrix-centered version of the many-worlds interpreta-
tion makes the locality and Lorentz covariance of our
interpretation more manifest at the cost of obscuring our
interpretation’s underlying ontology and the meaning of
probability.
Seen from this perspective, we can also better under-
stand why it is so challenging [69] to make sense of a
many-worlds-type interpretation as an ontologically and
epistemologically reasonable interpretation of quantum
theory: Attempting to do so leads to as much meta-
physical difficulty as trying to make sense of the Lorenz
gauge of Maxwell electromagnetism as an “ontologically
correct interpretation” of the Maxwell theory.10 Hence,
taking a lesson from classical gauge theories, we pro-
pose that many-worlds-type interpretations should in-
stead be regarded as being merely a convenient math-
ematical tool—a particular “gauge choice”—for estab-
lishing definitively that a given “unitary-gauge” inter-
pretation of quantum theory like our own is ultimately
consistent with locality and Lorentz invariance.
9 Observe that the eigenbasis of each system’s density matrix
therefore defines a preferred basis for that system alone—that
is, in a system-centric manner. We do not assume the sort of
universe-spanning preferred basis shared by all systems that is
featured in the traditional many-worlds interpretation; such a
universe-spanning preferred basis would lead to new forms of
nonlocality, as we describe in our companion paper [1].
10 Indeed, in large part for this reason, some textbooks [70] develop
quantum electrodynamics fundamentally from the perspective of
Weyl-Coulomb gauge A0 = ~∇ · ~A = 0.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this letter and in a more extensive companion pa-
per [1], we have introduced a new, conservative interpre-
tation of quantum theory that threads a number of key
requirements that we feel are insufficiently addressed by
other interpretations. In particular, our interpretation
identifies a definite ontology for every quantum system,
as well as dynamics for that ontology based on the overall
time evolution of the system’s density matrix, and sews
together ontologies for parent systems and their subsys-
tems in a natural way.
Falsifiability and the Role of Decoherence
As some other interpretations do, our own interpre-
tation puts decoherence in a central role for transform-
ing the Born rule from an axiomatic postulate into a
derived consequence as part of our larger approach to
resolving the measurement problem of quantum theory.
We regard it as a positive feature of our interpretation
that falsification of these decoherence-based claims would
mean falsification of our interpretation. We therefore
take great interest in the ongoing arms race between pro-
ponents and critics of decoherence, in which critics offer
up examples of decoherence coming up short[71–75] and
thereby push proponents to argue that increasingly re-
alistic measurement set-ups involving non-negligible en-
vironmental interactions resolve the claimed inconsisten-
cies [30, 54, 76, 77].
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